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WESTERN RESERVE 1AW REVIEW
Descent and Distribution
The "half and half ' statute, Ohio General Code Section 10503-5, which
governs the descent of property which came to an intestate relict from a
deceased spouse was held applicable in Natsonal Bank of Lma v. Allea2 '
to shares of stock of which the relict wife died possessed, although the
shares bequeathed to her by her husband subsequently had become the sub-
ject of a stock split. The probate court quite correctly found that the stock
split and the issuance of a new certificate to the relict wife had not de-
stroyed the identity of the stock.
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Injuries within Course of Employment
The perplexing issue of what constitutes death, injury or occupational
disease occasioned in the course of employment confronted Ohio courts in
several cases.
In Eggers v. lndustorm Commsston' datmant's decedent, while stand-
ing in the factory where he worked, suddenly fell to the floor and suffered
a superficial laceration of the scalp. No evidence was submitted relating to
any incident causing the fall or any unusual strain or condition upon the
defendant at the time of the fall. The supreme court in denying an award
to the widow held that no presumption exists that the fatal injury arose out
of the worker's employment. The dissent emphasized that it was far more
probable that the fall and accidental injury in a work place during working
hours presumably occurred in the course of employment and that this pre-
sumption should be controlling because no evidence was given indicating a
non-compensable injury like a heart attack.
The question of whether an employee was outside the zone of employ-
ment at the time of his death was raised in three Ohio cases. The court
of appeals stated in Coller v. BY Goodoch Co. 2 that if the claimant's
decedent were killed while trespassing on a railroad on route to work no
benefits can be given if the employer had provided another safer means of
entrance.
However, if the employee was killed crossing a public highway on the
way home after responding to an off-shift call to render specialized service,
he was within the zone of employment. The employee involved lived
across the public highway from the kilns he was hired to "salt down" and
was on call at all times. In Smith v. Imdustod Commssion3 the court of
n 104 N.E.2d 469 (Aflea Probate Ct. 1952)
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appeals held his work environment created this method of ingress and
egress which was a peculiar hazard to his work.
On the other hand, when an accountant of the Public Utilities Com-
mission, subject to call at all hours with no particular lunch period, returned
to a private company's office to check books after lunch, he could not bene-
fit for injuries sustained by slipping on a raised street car rail. It was held
in Scott v. Induustral Com=mson0 that no greater hazard was experienced
by the claimant than by the general public.
A coal miner suffered exposure by necessity of his work surroundings.
Circulatory ailment, heart ailment and arthritis directly caused by such
work were injuries sustained in the course and scope of employment ac-
cording to the court in Moskell v. Industrial CommsssonY
The care required to draft special charges before argument defining
scope of employment was emphasized in State v. Lovely.6 The defendant
requested that if the plaintiff were injured while operating a planing ma-
chine "which was no part of his duties" and against the express order of the
employer, the defendant was not liable. This charge appeared to state as a
fact that the plaintiff employee had been ordered not to operate the ma-
chine. Since that point was in issue, the charge was properly denied.
Who Is an Employee
A pilot who contracted to deliver airplanes throughout the country was
considered an independent contractor in Ruffi v. American Fly Away Ser-
mce, Inc.7 The court of appeals stated that the company controlled only
the result while the pilot controlled the method of accomplishment. A fatal
injury to the pilot, therefore, did not permit death benefits since no em-
ployer-employee relationship existed.
Extent of Compensation
The extent of compensation benefits was considered by the supreme
court in several cases. Section 1465-70 of the Ohio General Code was con-
strued in Beais v. Arwco Steel Corp.8 as protecting the employer from com-
mon law liability to a wife who sued for loss of consortium of her employee-
husband totally disabled by silicosis.
1157 Ohio St. 70, 104 N.E.2d 681 (1952).
'90 Ohio App. 181, 104 N.E.2d 600 (1950).
'90 Ohio App. 481, 107 NX.2d 220 (1948).
' 105 N.E2d 881 (Ohio App. 1951).
'91 Oluo App. 112, 107 N.E2d 543 (1951).
'91 Ohio App. 315, 104 N.E2d 585 (1950).
'104 N.E2d 37 (Ohio App. 1950). The pilot also departed from possible em-
ployee status by crashing as a result of "buzzing" a fishmg boat.
'156 Ohio St. 295, 102 N.E.2d 444 (1951).
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It was held in State ex rel Republic Rubber Dwsson v. Morse9 that;
although an injury does not cause death but merely accelerates it, a full
award for death benefits is valid. The employee received an injury to his
spine during employment which activated a brain tumor and hastened his
death. Thus, the compensation rule does not follow the wrongful death
action rule which permits mitigation of damages by evidence of a pre-
existing diseased condition in the decedent.
The strict silicosis rule in Section 1465-68a of the Ohio General Code
barred compensation for death when total disability did not occur within
two years from the last exposure prior to 1945. In that year the statutory
period was extended to eight years. The amendment, however, did not
operate retroactively to benefit the dependent of an employee last exposed in
1942 who died in 1948, according to the court in State ex rel. Bessler v. In-
dustral Commtsson.'0 The dissent preferred to fix the dependenes bene-
fits under the statute effective on the date of the employee's death rather
than the date of employee's last exposure."
Where a municipality paid an injured policeman a pension, the amount
of the pension payment represented by the city's contribution should be
deducted from the compensation award received by the policeman from the
state. Only the excess of the award, if any, should go to the former em-
ployee. The court in State ex rel. City of Columbus v. Industrial Commus-
ston12 thereby held that Section 1465-61 of the Ohio General Code was not
umpliedly repealed by Section 4628 which relates to pensions.
Premium Rates
An attack against premium rates fixed by the Industrial Commission
was presented in State ex rel. Gerspacher v. Coffenberry.1 3 A Cleveland
taxpayer brought mandamus to compel the Commission to refund to public
employers all excess monies collected over premium requirements. The
supreme court in dismissing the petition stated that the Commission must
be given wide area to fix rates, and their actions are presumed to be valid,
entered into in good faith and in sound judgment
Procedural Aspects
The Industrial Commission's power to modify an order on the showing
of new evidence was reaffirmed in State ex rel. S.S. Kresge Co. v. Industial
'157 Ohio St. 288, 105 N.E.2d 251 (1952).
10157 Ohio St. 297, 105 N.E.2d 264 (1952).
UId. at 307, 105 N.E.2d at 269 where Taft, J. dissented for the same reasons as
were stated in his dissent to State ex rel. Efford v. Industrial Commission, 151 Ohio
St. 109, 119, 84 N.E.2d 493, 496 (1949).
U158 Ohio St. 240, 108 N.E.2d 317 (1952).
157 Ohio St. 32, 104 N.E.2d 1 (1952).
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Commmson,14 while in Gireak v. Industral Commtsswn', a common pleas
court maintained its authority to remand the rehearing record to the Com-
mission for reopening and the takang of additional testimony in the case. No
express statute was cited in the Gireak case but prior cases 8 had permitted
remanding to correct errors in the rehearing record.
On appeal from the rehearing decision to the common pleas court it is
immaterial if the Industrial Commission denied the claim on both a juris-
dictional fact from which appeal is permitted and a non-jurisdictional fact
from which appeal will not be allowed. Liberal construction, according to
the court in Klen v. BY Goodrich Co., " will allow the appeal to be based
on the jurisdictional fact.
Removal of a state workmen's compensation case from an Ohio common
pleas court to a federal district court was denied in Decker v. Spcer Manu-
factarng Dtwston of Dana Corp.'s Employers submitting to Ohio's com-
pensation program were bound by its procedure. The court further stated
that the workmends compensation proceeding was not a civil action within
the meaning of the United States Code so as to allow a transfer of the action
to the federal court on the court on the ground of diversity of cimzenship.19
OLVER ScHROEDER, JR.
' 157 Ohlo St. 62, 104 N.E.2d 450 (1952)-
104 N.E.2d 716 (Trumbull Com. Pl 1951).
"Pyle v. Industrial Coxm'n, 139 Ohio St. 644, 652, 41 N.E.2d 857, 861 (1942);
Drakulich v. Industrial Comm'n, 137 Ohio St. 82, 27 N.E.2d 932 (1940).
"T 104 N.E.2d 90 (Summit Com. PL 1952).
3101 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. Ohio 1951).
" 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1948).
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